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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
.A.T R.ICH."MOND. 
LELA B·RUCE ET ALS. 
v. 
lviEREDITH FARRAR ET ALS. 
PETITION FOR AN .APPEAL. 
1.'o the Hono-rable Chief Justice and Associate Justices oi 
the Su.preme Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner~, Lela Bruce, Ales Bruce and Alma. Jones, 
respectfully represent that they are greatly aggrieved by a 
final decree of the Circuit Court of Charlotte County en-
tered on the 21st day. of October, 1929, in a. certain cb~n­
cery cause then depending in said court, wherein your pe-
titioners were complainants and ~Ieredith Farrar, Helen 
Spencer Farrar, Lizzie Spencer Farrar, in her own right, 
and as administ:vatrix of the estate of J. S. Farrar, deceased, 
Randolph Farrar, an infant within the age of twenty-one 
years, Horace Farrar, an infant within the age of twenty-
one years, "\V. H. Hamilton, B. C. Spurlock, J. C. Priddy, ad-
ministrator of the estate of J. A. Farrar, deceased, 'rhe First 
Stat.e Bank, Inc., Chase City, ·virginia, R. R .. Lane, trading 
as Zollinger, Lane & Co., C. D. Pennington, ,V. 0. Rolls & 
W. H. Owen, partners, trading as Pennington, Owen & Rolls, 
Dr. C. ,V. Tu~ker and ~T. C. Booth, trading as ,J. C. Booth 
& Co., and I-Iunter ~Iiller, Receiver of Farmers Savings Bank, 
nnd Ellen Farrar, widow of J. A. Farrar, deceased, wero 
defendants. A transcript of the record in said cause, or sa 
mucl1 thereof as may be necessary for a decision of the quos. 
tions presented l1erein, is submitted herewith. 
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STATE!\iENT OF THE CASE. 
. I 
J. A. Farrar died intestate on the 5th day of January, 
1.928, seized and possessed of a tract of land containing 
376:~ ·acres, in Charlotte County, Virginia, and cash and tan-
gible property amounting to one thousand two hundred a~d 
forty-three dollars and forty-three cents ($1,243.43). The sal(l 
J .. A. Farrar left as his distributees and heirs at la"r, a widow. 
Ellen Farrar, and five children, your petitioners, and two 
sons, Meredith Farrar and J. S. marrar. l\Ieredith Farrar 
and J. S. Farrar were indebted to their father at the time ~f 
the latter's death, by simple contract debts, not reduced to 
judgment, represented by notes in an amount exceeding in 
the case of one, and practically equalling, in the case of t~e 
other, the value of said son's one-fifth undivided interest in 
.the real esta.te of which their father died seized. None of 
your petitioners owed their father anything. l\Ieredith and 
J. S. Farrar were also indebted to the First State Bank 
of Chase City, to Pennington, Owen & Ralls, and to other 
creditors, defendants in this suit, in large amounts, when 
their father died, upon which debts judgments have been 
obtained, and duly docketed, subsequent to the death of J. A. 
l!,arrar. Subsequent to the. death of J. A. Farrar, and be ... 
fore the ·commencement of this suit, J. S. Farrar died in-
testate. This suit was instituted by your petitioners against 
t:he administrator and "iclo,\r of .J. A. Farrar, and the ad-
ministrator and heirs at law of J. S. Farrar, and the creditors 
of Meredith and J. S. Farrar. The creditors of l\iereditl1 
and J. S. Farrar 'vere seeking to subject their respective 
interests in the real estate of \vhich J. A. Farrar died ·seized 
and possessed to the payment of their debts. 
The bill filed hy your petitioners prays that the entire 
estate of ,J. A. Farrar, both real ·and personal, may be ad-
ministered by the court and distributed and divided among 
his heirs at law; that the incleht~dness of ~Ieredith and J. S. 
Farrar to their father be ascertained and deducted from 
their shares in his estate before anything- is paid to those 
claiming under them. J~ A. Farrar left sufficient personal -
cstrute to pa.y all of his debts so that it \Vas not necessary 
to sell the real property for the payment of debts. The 
case \Vas referred to a commissioner, who was required, 
am.ong other thing·s, to report "the heirs at law of J. A. 
Farrar, and the respective proportions in which they are 
entitled to share or participate in the distribution and par-
tition of the personal and real estate of which the said J. A. 
Farrar died seized and possessed''. The commissioner, after 
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taking the accounts, found and reported that J\feredith-Farrar 
had no interest, because, he, at .the ·time of J. A .. Farrar's 
death, owed the estate an amount in excess of his share there-
in, and that the interest of J. 18. Farrar, if it exists at all, 
is small. The Commissioner further reported that a.n heir's 
indebtedness to the estate creates an equitable lien on his 
interest in the decedent's real estate, superior to the liens 
of judgments docketed ag·aiust the heir. The judgment credi-
tors of lVIeredith and J. S. Farrar excepted to the commis-
sioner's report, and the court, by decree entered on the 21st 
day of October, 1929, sustained the exceptions filed to the 
report of the . Commissioner and decided that the lien debts 
of record against the interest of J\:Ieredith and J. S. Farrar 
in the real estate of the deceased father, J. A. Farrar, were 
superior in dignity to the contract debts due by 1\feredith 
and J. S. Farrar to the estate of J. A. Farrar. 
ASSIGNl\IENT OF ERROR. 
Your petitioners make the following assignment of error: 
The court erred in its decree of October 21st, 1929, in sus-
taining the exceptions to the Commissioner's report, and in 
holding that the lien of the creditors of Meredith and J. S. 
Farrar \Yas superior in dignity to the contract debts due by 
the said J\1:eredith and J. S. Farrar to the estate of the said 
J. A. Farrar. 
ARGU~!ENT. 
By the exceptions to the Commissioner's report, the ques-
tion was presented as to the superiority of the liens of the 
estate for debts due by the heirs to the estate and judgment 
liens of other creditors of such heir. 
The question presented here does not appear to l1ave.ever 
been passed upon by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia. There are certain preliminary observations which are 
well settled principles of law, and 'vhich require no citation 
of authority. In the first place, the c.reditors of Meredith 
and J. S. Farrar stand in the· shoes of the said 1\{eredith and 
,T. S. Farrar. The creditors can only subject the interest of 
their debtor in the estate. - If tl1e equitable lien of the estate 
for debts due by the heir is effective against the heir, then 
necessarily it is also effective against the creditors. 
The Ia.,,r favors an equal distribution of the decedent's estate 
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among those entitled thereto. This is the policy as laid down 
in Virginia by several cases. 
In Corbitt v. Wri,ght, 91 S. E. 612, Whittle, J., in deliver-
ing the opinion, said: 
"The theory of our statute of descent and distribution is 
that the estate of the ancestor at his death (subject to the 
rights of the wido,v, if there be one) passes in coparcenary 
equally to his children.'' 
This principle was also announced by this court in Payne 
·v. Payne, 104 S. E. 713. Prentis, J., in discussing the statute 
with reference to advancements, section 5278 of the Code, 
says: 
"The statute does not assume to interfere 'vitb the free-
dom of the ancestor to prefer one or more of his descendants 
in the distribution of his estate, but applies only where, having 
distributed a par.t of his estate to them, he has left part of 
it undisposed of, to be distributed under tbe statute of descents 
and distributions. In .such case the statute, in its endeavor 
to accomplish tl1at equality which is equity, equalizes the 
ishares of those descendants \vho claim to share in the dis-
tribution of the property which has been undisposed of, 
by requiring that those who have received advancements 
shall first have their value taken into account; that is, it gives 
them the option either to do so or to be excluded from sharing 
in the partition and distribution of the property \Vhich the 
decedent has failed to distribute." 
It will thus be seen from the Virginia decisions that the 
policy of the law favors an equal distribution of the estate 
of the decedent among his heirs . 
.It will also be noted that the proceeding in this case is in 
equity. The better reasoned of the cases hereafter cited sus. 
tain the right of the administrator to set off the debt o\viiig 
by the heir upon the principle of an equitable lien. These 
cases hold that this lien in equity is superior to the lien of 
cr~ditors represented by judgment or otherwise ·against the 
he1r. 
As before noted, the question here presented has not been 
directly passed upon by the courts in Virginia, although there 
is much authority from the courts of the other states of the 
union. These authorities are somewhat in conflict, but the 
majority opinion sustains the priority of tl1e lien of the estate 
over the lien of creditors of the heir. 
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The cases adverse to our contention, 'vhich are really few 
ln number, generally follow lf.farvin v. Bowlby, 142 Mich. 245,, 
7 Annotated Cases 559. In this case the priority of the lien 
of the judgment creditor over the lien of the estate is sus-
tained upon the technical ground that while such right in 
favor of the estate exists as to personal property,. it does 
not exist as to real property, because real property de.scends 
directly to the heir. 'l,his case overlooks the equitable lien 
in favor of the estate, and is put upon the technical ground 
that since the administrator had not reduced his claim to 
judgment, that the lien of the judgment creditor :flrst at-
tached to· the interest of the heir as real estate descends 
directly to the heir. 
In a note a ppcnded in 1 Annotated Cases, page 563, it is 
sl1own that the majority and better opinion is contrary to 
the holding of Jl.fa·rvin v. Bowlby. 
Sten.son v. llal-vorson, 28 N. D. 151, 147 N. \V. 800, A.nno-
tated Cases 1916D, 1289, holds directly contrary to M at·vin 
v. Bowlby. The facts of this case are almost identical 'vith 
the instant ease. In the cited case, J\Iartiu G. Flaagan 'va.s 
the son of Gunder 0. Flaagan. The father died intestate, 
leaving among his other heirs, the said }fartin G. Flaagnn. 
l\fartin owed his father a large amount of money, evidenced 
by promissory notes. J\1artin also owed other creditors who 
had reduced their claims to judgment against l\1artin before 
the death of his father. The question arose as to tho 
s-uperiority of the claims of the estate of Gunder 0. Flna.gan 
for the indehtedness owed by 1\Ia.rtin, represented by notes, 
and the claims of the judgment creditors against the interest 
of l\Iartin in Hw estate. It wns held that the estate lutcl 
nn equitable lien upon the interest of J\ifartin, which was 
superior to the liens of the judgment creditors. 
rrhis case reviews the authorities at leng·th and disc.nsses, in 
detail, the holding in the case of Jllarv·i·n v. Bowlby, which 
it refuses to follo,v. · 
The Stenson ease refers to a statute of North Dakota, undel~ 
which personal property as well as real propertY de8c.ends to 
the heir, snhjec.t only to the payment of the "'debts of tlw 
estate. Some of tho eases attempt to distinguish the r>rin-
ciples involved on ncconnt of such statute. But H js s:ub-
mit:ted that SUCh statute does not affect the prineipJGS in-
volved. In Virginia, the real estate descends directly to 
the heir, snhjcct only to be sold for the debts of the estate. 
'J,Jw onJ~r effect of ~uch a statute as that of North Dn.l<otn 
is 1o pnt personal property on a parity with real propcrf.y. 
Therefore, surh a statute J1as no bearing on the authority of 
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1;hc cases deeided on the principle of the estate retaining· au 
oquit.~hle lien. 
lt will be noted that the claim of the estate in the instant 
case is not in the nature of an advancement. The debts here 
presented nre represented by the promissory notes of 1\{ere-
<.lith and tT. S. Farrar. The statutes with reference to ad-
vance·me1lts were enacted to insure an equal distribution of 
the estate among those entitled thereto. There was no neces-
.sif.y for such statutory enactment with reference to debts 
o'ving the ancestor by the heir, represented, as in the instant 
case, by promissory notes. This proposition is considered 
and disposed of in the Stenson case in a very satisfactory 
maJlner. The court, in delivering the opinion on page 1292 
of the report, said: 
"With due deference to the opinion of the 1\Iiehigan courts, 
we think the great 'veight of authority, as w·cll as the. better 
reasoning, is opposed to its holcli'ng in llfarvin v. B01vlby, 142 
Tv'fich. 245. * '~ * 
''As stated by ,Judge Woerner in 2 Am. Law of Adminis-
b~at.ion., 2d Ed. 564, 'the tendency seems to be in favor of 
the right of set off' as to real as well as personal property, 
and in 1 Ross on Probate La"r & Practice, p. 845, it is un-
qualifiedly stated that 'the indel)tedness of a distributee to the 
eAtate may he de~lucted from his share.' >)(• * * 
"The reasoning of appellants' counsel that because the 
legislature singled out advancements and made them subject 
to equitable set-off, and did not do so as· to indebtedness owing 
by heirs or distributees, tha.t the legislative intent was not 
t.o allow such set-off as to such indebtedness is, we think, un-
sound. The legislation thus enacted w·a.s, no doubt, for the 
purpose of distinguishing advancements from gifts, and not 
:for the purpose of affecting, in the least, the rights of heirs 
or distrihutees who might be indebted to the estate. Indebt-
edneAs due the estate is a part of its assets for distribution 
aftet· payment of the debts and expenses of administration; 
but neither gifts nor advancements can be thus considered. 
Legislation was thus necessary in the one case, but not in the 
other. As said by the Ohio court in J(eever v. Hunter, 62 
Ohio St. 616, 57 N. E. 454, 'A proposit~on ·necessarily in-
'volved in the decision of the circuit court is that in a-case 
of this rharacter a son who owes a debt which is payable at 
all events oceupies a better position than one 'vl1o has re-
oeivod an adva~ement w·hich is not payable otherwise than 
as. it. maY serve to diminish his inheritance. 
,·'The 'conclusion does not contribute to the equality of 
- ----- --=-~--------
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inheritance which is made so prominent in the legislation a·nd 
the decisions of this state. The statute upou the subject of 
advancements distinguishes gifts by way of advancement from 
other gifts. It does ·not make a gift by way of advancement 
mol'e onerous to the child who receives it than is a debt to 
the child who owes it. It is not important whether, to secure 
equalit~; in cases of this character, we adopt the doctrine of 
equitable setoff, as has been done by some courts, or, for 
that purpose, regard the debt as an advancement, as has been 
done· by others.· The ground of decision is that it is in-
equitable and at variance with the policy defined in our 
statutes to permit one to share in an estate which is diminished 
by his default and to the prejudice of those whose rights 
are equal to his.' 'rhe court then quotes from Judge Woerner 
in his American Law of Administration, vol. 1, 71, as fol-. 
lows : 'The distinction behveen debts o"\"\ing by an heir and 
advancements made to him·by the intestate is sharply drawn; 
in some states debts so owing cannot be deducted from the 
slu:lre of the heir in the real esta.t.e, and from the personal 
estate only by "ray of set-off, but the true principle seems 
to be that a debt owing by an heir constitutes part of the 
assets of the estate, as much as that of any other debtor, for 
which he should account before he can be allowed' to receive 
anything out of the other assets; and it is so held in the 
United States.'· It should be noted that Ohio, as well as sev-
eral other states, have statutes similar to North Dakota rela-
tiYe to advancements and the duty of off-setting the same in 
the distribution of estates.'' 
The following cases follow the Stenson case in holding 
1hat the share of an heir in an intestate's realty is chargeable 
with the debts due from the heir to the estate: 
Adams v. Yaflwey, 105 ~Iiss. 233, 62 ~o. 229. 
Duf!JJ v. Duffy, 155 l\io. 144, 55 S. W. 1002. 
Ayres v. J(-in,q~ 168 l\:fo. 244, 67 S. W. 558, 90 Am. St. Rep. 
452. . 
AJtres Y. J(in.fJ, 168 Mo. 249, 67 S. \V. 1100. 
Small v. Usher, 77 S. C. 115, 57 ·S. E. 623. 
Oxsheer v. l'la1)e, (Tex.) 37 L. R. A. 98, "ras decided on 
facts identieal with the instant case. The heir, Oxsheer, 
owed the estate certain amounts represented by his promis-
r-;ory notes. The defendant, Nave, secured judgment a.ga.inst 
Oxsheer and elaimed his judgment created a lien upon the 
interest of Oxsheer in the real property which descended to 
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him from his ancestor. It was not claimed that the amount 
owing by Oxsheer was in any way in the nature of an ad-
vancement. It was held tha.t the claim of the estate being in 
the nature of au equitable lien ''ras superior to the claim of 
the judgment creditor of Oxsheer, and that the claim of the 
estate had to be first satisfied. The court here discusses the 
·principles involved as to whether it is a set-off or retainer, 
but decided that it is properly neither, but that the right 
exists upon broad principles of equity. At page 101, the 
court said: 
"The rigl1t to have the debt of the legatee or distributeH 
charged to him in the adjustment of the legacy or the dis-
tributive share is called a right of 'set off' or of 'retainer'. 
But the inaccuracy of the former expression is pointed out in 
Cherry v. Boultbee, 4 :Niyl. & C. 442, and has frequently been 
recognized in other cases. So the improper use of the word 
'retainer' in the same connection ha.s been commented upon. 
Re Akennan., (1891) 3 Oh. 212. The right, 'tn our opin,ion, 
rests not so much upon any rule of set-off or of retainer, as 
upon the broad princ-iples of equity." 
This case also discusses the reasoning in tl1e Bowlby case 
and otl1ers denying the rigl1t of the estaf.e, upon the technical 
ground that the real property descends directly to the heir. 
In Texas, there was a. statute similar to the North Dakota 
statute discussed in the Halvorson case, to the effect that the 
personal as well as the real property descended directly to 
the heir. The court discussed this proposition, and decided 
that such statute has no bearing on the principles upon which 
tile case is really decided. · 
"In the able argument of counsel for the appellee it is 
ingeniously insisted that, according to the "reight of authority 
in this country, the rule which requires the debtor distributee 
to account for his debt does not apply to :real estate, he-
cause that descends directly to the heirs, and that, since our 
statute devolves the title botl1 of real and personal property 
directly upon the l1eirs, in this state it docs not apply _at 
all. But we apprel1encl the declaration of our statute as to 
the descent of property makes no difference, since without 
it the title of the distributees to the personal property after 
the payment of debts 'vould be none tl1e less substantial. This 
is recognized even at common la,v. In Cooper v. Coop~r, L. R. 
7 H. L. 53, 30 L. T. N. S. 409, th~ lord chancellor says: 'The 
rule of the statute of distribution. wl1ich requires the con-
L. Bruce, et als., v. :h:L Farrar, et als. 9 
version of an intestate's estate into money, is introduced 
simply for the benefit of creditors, and the facility of division 
among the next of kin. But, as regards the substantial title 
to property, the rigl1t. of the next of kin (subject only t.o· 
the claims of creditors) is· complete.' The question cannot 
be properly resolved. upon such a technical principle.'' 
Wilson v. Channell, 102 !{an. 793, 175 Pac. 95, 1 A. L. R.· 
987, was decided on facts identical with the instant case. In 
making some preliminary observations, the court said: 
''Some observations concerning undisputed principles. of 
law· may assist in correctly answering this question. By sec. 
7320 of the General Statutes of 1915, a judgment of the dis-
triet court is a. lien on the real estate of a judgment debtor 
within the county in which the judgment was rendered. This 
ljen attaches to the interest of the judg;ment debtor, and to 
11othing more. An heir has no interest in his an0estors' 
real property; but, wl1en the ancestor dies intestate, tha.t 
property descends at once to the heir. Advancements are 
recognized by statute, and must he considered in the :final 
distribution of the estate of the deceased person." 
It will thus be seen that the la"r under 'vhich this case was 
decided w·as identical to the law of ·virginia. The judgment 
"ras a lien on the real estate of the judgment debtor, which 
lien attaches to any interest of the judgment debtor and noth-
ing more. Like Virginia, tl1e heir has no interest. in l1is 
ancestor's real estate until the death of the ancestor intestate, 
hut upon such death, the real estate descends directly to the 
heir. Under similar facts, and under identical law, tl1is ease 
decides that the equitable lien of the estate is s1;1perior to 
the lien of the judgment creditor against the share of tl1e 
heir. 
The case discusses verv satisfactorilv the distinction noted 
in some of the cases between personal and real property, 
and shows clearly that in principle there is no sound reason 
for making such distinction. At page 990, 1 A. L. R., in dis-
cussing this proposition, the court says: 
''These Kansas cases follo'v the same reasoning· as that 
found in Stenson v. H. S. Halvorson Co.; but both l{ansas 
cases arose over the distribution of personal property. A 
number of cases make a distinction between personal and 
1·eal property, so far as the application of the principle no\V 
being discussed is concerned. There is no substantial·justi· 
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fication for a less equitable rule in fayor of the estate, so 
far as real property is concerned, than there is for the rule, 
acknowledged by almost all the authorities, concerning per-
sonal property. If, in the distribution of personal property, 
f1 distributee- who is a debtor of the estate gets an advantage 
over the other distrihutecs, because his debt is not deducted 
fron1 his distributive share, then the inheritor of real prop-
erty likewise gets an advantage over the other inheritors, if 
his debt to the estate cannot be in some way deducted from 
the share of real property which he receives. The equities 
·which compel the rule concerning personal property are just 
as strong in favor of the same rule concerning real prop-
erty." 
In. an e:xl1austive note appended to TV·ilson v. Cha·nnell, 
found ..in 1 A. L. R., at page 991, the case involving the point 
hero under discussion, are collected, and it is shown that 
the better opinion favors the priority of the estate over that . 
of the judgment creditor. 
r1~o the same effect is lVood v. Knott, (Iowa) 194 N. W. 
953, 30 -A. L. R. 768. 
See cases collected in note 30 A. L. R. 775. To the same 
effeet, see Lightner v. Light-ner, (1\Io.) 73 A. S. R .. 374; Webb 
v. ·li'uller, 22 L. R. A. 177; Nelson v. IJ1urfee, 69 Ala. 598; 
Appeal of Cheyney, 148 Penn. State 142, 23 Atl. 1053 . 
. r:rhe following late cases follow Wilson, v. Channell, allove 
cite<b Peoples Bank v. Ten·ell, (I(an.) 244 Pac. 1061; J( en-
n~(ly v. Oriley, (Ariz.) 236 Pac. 716. Blackwood v. Black-
, ~VO(}(l, (I\:an.) 242 Pac. 451. 
-In B,ro·wn Y. jjf aft i·ngly, 91 ICy. 275, 15 S. W. 353, it is held 
Uwt the distributee's interest in the real estate should be 
oxiinguished to the extent of the amount he has received from 
th~ aJlcestor so far as it exceeds his interest in the personal 
ost:ate. In passing upon this point, the court says: 
"He ~tauds in the attitude of ha~ing received so much 
from the estate, and, if his distributive share in the personal 
estate is not equal to the amount thus received, the real 
cst.ate ought to be held to be charged with the payment of 
the remainder in the division, and he to receive that much 
less. This is the only equitable rule; were it otherwise, the 
one heir might virtually get a double or treble portion.'' 
To· the same effect is Keever v. Hu.nter, 62 Ohio St. 616, 
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57. N. E. 454, where it 'vas held that the son who was in-
debted to his father in an amount exceeding the value of his 
interest in his father's real and personal estate, took no 
interest in the lands of 'vhich his father died seized, which 
could be subjected to the payment of a judgment recovered 
against him, and upon whieh execution had been issued and 
levied upon the land. This decision was put upon the grom1a 
that it would be inequitable to allo'v one heir to thus receive 
an advantage over the other heirs in the estate of his ances-
tor. It was further held that it "1'as at variance with the 
policy of the la'v declared in the statutes with reference to 
advancements. 
This point is covered in 11 R. C. L., page 247, as follows: 
'' 279. Right of· R.eta.iner as Affecting Real Estate.-The 
doctrine of retention, it has been held, applies only to specific 
legacies and interests in the personal estate of the decedent. 
According to this "\tJC'Y the distributive share or the real 
.estate of an heir w)lo is a debtor to the estate is not charge-
able ''rith such indebtedness even where the land is sold 
and the proceeds distributed. In all such cases the debt 
of the heir must be collected by proceedings brought in 
the manner usual for collecting any other indebtedness due 
to the estate. The reason given for this limitation of the 
general rule· is that tJ10 real estate of the intestate descends 
directly to the heirs upon the death of the ancestor, and vests 
in them, subject only to t:he debts of the estate. In the case 
of testacy the principle is applied that if the testator intends 
to do so, he m.ay charge the estate devised with the duty of 
paying any debt 'vhich may be due from the devisee to the 
testator, and his omission to impose such a condition evinces 
an intention to make the devise unconditional. In the majority 
of :iurisdietions, however, this exception in regard to real 
estate as to the general rule tlmt an executor or adminis-
trator may retain a debt due from an l1eir or legatee is not 
recognized, and hence it is that a debt due to the estate 
from an heir mav be deducted from his distributive share 
of the proceeds of real estate which has been sold in process 
of administration. ·The view taken by the courts that refuse 
to recognize the exception seems to ·be that the heir takes 
l1is share in the realty of the intestate subject to all equities 
exi.sting in favor of the estate. And this has been held to be 
the rule applicable under statutes by virtue of which the 
real property of an intestate is made cl1a rgeable with the 
payment of debts equally with the personalty, except that 
the personalty must first be exhausted.'' 
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CONCLUSION. 
It ·will thus be seen from the cases herein cited that the 
majority and better opinion is to the effect that there exists 
. in favor of the estate an equitable lien against the interest 
of the heir for the amount w·hic.h said heir owes the estate. 
That this lien is superior in dignity to the lien of the creditor 
against such heir's interest. The policy of the la'v favors 
equal distribution of the estate of one "rho dies intestate 
among those entitled thereto. Tlus l1as been declared to 
he the policy of Virginia by many decided cases, some of 
wl1ich are cited herein. It is further shown to be the policy 
of the la\v by the enactment of statutes covering advance-
ments. We submit that claim of the petitioners is supported 
by the plainest princi pies of equity. If their claim is not 
sustained, the effect is to give 1\{eredith and J. S. Farrar much 
more than their share in the estate of their father. 
This would 'vork an unequal distribution among the heirs 
entitled thereto. 
It is respectfully submitted that the assignment of error is 
well taken. The Circut Court should have overruled the 
exceptions to the Commissioner's report, and entered a de-
cree confirming same. 
Because of this error, apparent on the face of the record, 
petitioners Lela B.ruce, Ales Bruce and Alma Jones pray 
an appeal from and supersedeas to said decree of October 
21st, 1929, and that said decree may be re.\Tersed in toto and 
such decree be entered in the premises as to this court shall 
seem, right and proper. 
Petitioners allege that on the 14th day of J\farch, 1930, a 
. copy of this petition was mailed to tT. J{ent Early, Charlotte 
Court House, Virginia, of counsel representing the defendants 
in the court belo\v. . 
' 1 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALLEN & JEFFERSON, 
Counsel. 
LELA BRUCE, 
ALES BR.UCE, 
ALJ\tiA ,JONES, 
By Counsel. 
I, Peyton G. ,Jefferson, an attorney at Jaw, practicing in 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do ce~ify that 
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the f~regoing decree should be reviewed by the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia. 
Given under my hand this 8 day of ~larch, 1930. 
Received 1\1:arch 19, 1930. 
PEYTON G. JEFFERSON, 
Attorney at La,v. 
II. S. J. 
To the Clerk at Richmond. 
]~eceived 1\rfarc.h 25, 1930. 
Appeal allowed. Supersedeas awarded. Bond, $300.00. 
HENRY \¥". IIOLT. 
Received l\Iarcl1 31, 1930. 
H. S. J. 
VIRGINIA: 
PLEAS before the Circuit Court of Charlotte County, on 
the 21st day of October, 1929. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: at the R.ules held 
in the clerk's office of the said court on the first Monday 
in 1\1:ay, 1.928, came Lela Bruce, Ales Bruce and Alma. ,Jones 
and filed their bill of complaint against l\feredith lf'arra.r, 
<Helen Spencer Farrar, Lizzie Spencer IParrar, in her own 
right, and as administratrix of the estate of J. S. li1arrar, 
deeeased, Randolph Farrar, au infant within tlw age .>f 
twenty-one years, I-Iorace :B.,arrar, an infant within the age 
of twenty-one years, \V. I-I. Hamilton, B. C. Spurlock, J. C. 
Priddy, administrator of the estate of J. A. Farrar, decea~ed, 
The First State Bank, Inc., Chase City, Virginia, R. R. I.~anc~ 
trading as Zollinger, Lane & Co., C. D. Pennington, VV. 0. 
Holls & \V. If. Owen, partners, trading as Penningto11, Owen 
& Rolls, Dr. C. \V. Tucker and J. C. Booth, trading as J. U. 
Booth & Co., and Hunter Miller, R-eceiver of :B,armers S-avings 
Bank, and Ellen Farrar, widow of J. A. Farrar, deceHsed, de-
fendants, which bill is in the words and· figures following: 
to-wit: 
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To the Honorable Circuit Court of Charlotte County: 
Your complainants, Lela Bruce, Ales Bruce and Alma Jones, 
. "respectfully represent unto your I:Ionor as a basis for the 
relief hereinafter prayed for the following case: 
(1) That J. A. Farrar, who had been a resident of the 
County of Charlotte for many years, departed this life in 
the early part of January of this year, intestate, leaving 
as his distributees and heirs a.t law the following· perseus: 
Lela Bruce, daughter, Ales Bruce, daughter, Alma. Jones 
(nee Bruce) daughter, 1\:Iereclith Farrar, son, J. S. 
1)age 2 ~ Farra~ and Ellen Farrar, his widow. 
(2) That on the day of ~{arch, 1928, the said J. S. 
lParrar -departed this life intestate, leaving as his distributees 
and lwirs at law· Lizzie Spencer Farrar, wido,v, and Ran-
dolph Farrar and Horace ]-,arrar, infants within the age of 
twenty-one years. 
(3) That the said J. A. li,arrar left personal estate amount-
ing to several thousand dollars in value, consisting of money 
in bank, liberty bonds, household and kitchen furniture and 
farming implements. 
( 4) That the said ,J. A. Farrar also died seized and pos-
sessed of valuable real estate consisting of that certain tract 
or parcel of land, lying and being in Bacon J\ilagisterial Dis-
trict, ChaFlotte County, Virginia, adjoining the lands of F. B. 
_Roberts, ICings R.oad, Bluestone Creek, and being the samC' 
parcel or tract of land conveyed to the ·said J. A. Farrar by 
deed from Emily G. Woods, dated August 4th, 1897, and con-
taining at that time 396 3/4 acres, from which the said J. A. 
Farrar has sold .to vValter R.obertson 8 acres by deed dated 
tTune 15th, 1904, and to Allen Burwclll2 acres by deed dated 
tT an nary 21st, 1906, leaving a. residue of 376 3/4 acres, more 
or less. · 
(5) That tJ1e defendant, ,J. C. Priddy, Sheri·ff of the County 
of Charlotte, as such, qualified as administrator on the estate 
of the said J. A. Fnrrar, deceased. 
(6) That the said Lizzie Spencer Farra~, ctnali:fied as ad-
nliuistratrix of the estate of the said J. S. Farrar, deceased. 
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(7) That the First State Bank, Incorporated; R. R. Lane, 
trading as Zollinger, Lane & Company; C. D. Pen-
page 3 } nington, \V". 0. Rolls and W. II. Owen, partne~s, 
trading as Pennington, Owen & Rolls; C. W. Tucker 
~nd J. 0. Booth, trading as J. 0. Booth & Company; and 
Hunter ~filler, Receiver of the Farmers Savings Bank, In-
corporated, are creditors of the said Jesse Farrar and the 
said ~1eredith Farrar. 
(8) That on January 9th, 1928, the said defendant, Mere-
dith Farrar and his wife, Helen Spencer Farrar, undertook 
to transfer and c.onvey unto the .said defendant, "\V. H. Hamil-
ton, for an alleg-ed cash consideration of FIFTEEN HUN-
DR.ED DOLLARS ($1,500.00), all of the right, title .and in-
terest of the said J\1eredith Farrar in and to the versonal 
estate of which the said J. A. Farrar died possessed, and all 
of the undivided right, title and interest of the said Mere-
dith Farrar in and to the sa.id real estate of which the said 
~T. A. Farrar died seized and possessed. 
(9) That at the same time, the said .J. S. Farrar, 'vho was 
then living, and his wife, Lizzie Spencer Farrar, attempted 
to transfer and convey to the said defendant, B. C. Spurlock, 
all of the right, title and interest of the said ,J. S. -Farrar in 
and to· the personal estate of which the said .J. A. Farrar 
died seized and possessed, and all of the undivided right, 
title and interest of the said .J. S. Farrar in and to the said 
real estate of which the said J. A. Farrar died seized and 
possessed. 
(10) That on the 27th day of January, 1928, the said de-
fendant, the First State ·Bank of Chase City, Incorporated, 
duly filed suits in equity against the said ~Ieredith Farrar 
and ,Jesse S. Farrar, and t.lieir grantees, to have said con-
veyances set aside and declared null and void as voluntary 
and fraudulent, and that a Us pendens was duly filed in each 
case, a11d recorded as the law directs. 
page 4 r .(11) That your complainants know nothing of the 
alleged fraudulent nature of said conveyances, and 
are in no way concerned therein. They allege and charge, 
however, that if said conveyances shall he declared to be 
valid, they are effective only to the extent of transferring 
and conveying the interest of the said Meredith Farrar and 
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Jesse Farrar in the real and personal estate of the said 
J. A. Fa.rrar, deceased; and if said conveyances be void, 
as alleged hy said First State Bank of Chase City, Incor-
porated, then the said First State Bank of Chase City, In-
corporated, and other creditors, can subject to the payment 
of ther debts, the right, title and interest only of the said 
Jesse Farrar and l\ieredith Farrar in the said personal and 
real estate of 'vhich the said J. A. Farrar died seized and 
possessed. 
(2) Your complainants further allege that upon the date 
of the death of the said J. A. Farrar, the said Meredith Far-
rar was inc!ebted to the said J. A. Farrar in a large sum, 
to-wit: in the sum of at least hventy-five hundred dollars 
($2,500.00) eighteen hundred dollars ($1,800.00) of 'vhich is 
evidenced by negotiable interest-bearing notes, secured by 
crop liens and deeds of trust, on personal property, of record 
in the clerk's office of the Circuit Court of Charlotte County. 
(13) That said securities proved to be worthless, and the 
said J. A. Farrar was unal)le to realize anything thereon 
prior to his death; so that upon the date of his date the 
said }rferedith Farrar owed him the said sum of fifteen hun-
dred dollars ($1,500.00) evidenced by negotiable note as afore-
said, and {he said sum of three hundred ($300.00), likewise 
evidenced hy negotiable note; and, that, in addition thereto, 
the said Meredith Farrar owed the said J. A. Farrar, upon 
the date of the death of the latter, between five hundred and 
a thousand dollars by way of open account, endorsements, 
etc.; and your complainants here allege and 'charge 
page 5 ~ that neither the said \V. II. llamilton by virtue of 
said alleged fraudulent deed, nor the said creditors 
. of the said l\feredith Farrar, in the event said deed be set 
aside, are entitled to anything from the estate of said J. A. 
lParrar, deceased, until the said l\Iereclith Farrar has ac-
counted for and paid over to the estate the entire amount of 
the indebtedness due by him to said estate; and that in 
the event of tl1e failure or inabilitv of the said l\Ieredith 
Farra.r to pay to the estate the d~bts which he is due to 
it, then the said indebtedness should he deducted from his 
share or interest in said estate, and the said Hamilton, if 
said deed be held to be -valid, is entitled to only the balance 
remaining; or if said conveyance be held to be void, then the 
creditors of the said l\feredith Farrar are entitled to only 
the balance remaining after the deduction from the said Mere-
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dith Farrar's share of the entire indebtedness due by him to 
the estate of the said J. A. Farrar, deceased. 
(14) Your complainants would further allege that upon 
the date of the death of the said J. A. Farrar, the said J. S. 
Farra.r was indebted to the said J. A. Farrar in a la.rge sum, 
to-wit: the sum of at least one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), 
evidenced by negotiable notes and open accounts, comprising 
money which the said J. A. Farrar loaned the said Jesse 
Farrar during the life time of the said J. A. and ,Jesse Farrar; 
that the estate of the said ,J. A. Farrar is in possession of no 
securities whatsoever for the repayment of said money, and 
that the said Jesse Farrar left no property out of wl1ich 
sa1d debts can be made, except his distributive share in the 
personal property of which the said J. A. Farrar died seized 
and possessed, and his proper sha.re of the real estate of 
which the said J. A. Farrar died seized; and your complain-
ants here allege and charge that neither the said B. C: Spur-
lock by V'.irtue of said alleged fraudulent deed, nor the said 
creditors of the said Jesse Farrar, in the event said 
page G ~ deed be set aside, are entitled to anything from 
the estate of the said J. A. Farrar, deceased, nnt.il 
the said ,Jesse Farrar has accounted for and paid oVer to the 
said esta.te the entire amount of the indebtedness due by him 
to said estate; and that in the event of the failure or inability 
of the said Jesse Farrar to pay to the estate the debt whicl1 
h.e is due to it, then the said indebtedness should be deducted 
from his share or interest in said estate, and the said Sptu·-
lock, if said deed be held valid, is entitled to only the balance 
remaining; or, if said conveyances be l1eld to be void, then 
the creditors of the said Jesse Farrar are entitled to only 
the balance remaining after deduction from the said Jesse 
]farrar's share of the entire indebtedness due by him to 
the estate of the said J. A. Farrar, deceased. . 
Upon consideration whereof, and for as much as yo11r 
complainants are remediless in the premises, save by the 
aid of a court of equity where alone sucl1 matters are prop-
(~rly cognizable, your eomplaina.nts pra.y that the said Mere-
dith Farrar, Helen Spencer Farrar, Lizzie Spencer Farrar, 
in her own rtight, and as administratrix of the estate of ,J. S. 
Farrar, deceased, Randolph ·Farrar, an infant within the 
age of twenty-one years, Horac.e Farrar, an infant witl1in 
the age of twenty-one years, \V. H. Hamilton, B. C. Spurlock, 
.T. C. Priddy, administrator of the estate of ,T. A. Farrar, 
deceased, The First State Bank, Inc., Chase City, Virginia, 
R-. R .. Lane, trading as Zollinger, Lane & Co., C. D. Penning--
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ton, W. 0. Rolls and W. If. Owen, partners, trading as Pen-
nington, Owen & Rolls, Dr. C. W. Tucker and J. C. Booth, 
trading as J. C. Booth & Co., and Hunter Miller, receiver 
of Farmers Savings Bank and Ellen Farrar, wido,v of J. A. 
~,a1-rar, deceased be made parties defendants to this bill, 
and required, but not on their oaths, the oaths being hereby 
expressly waived, to answer the same; that a proper guardian 
ad lite·m may be assig11ed to the said infant de-
page 7 ~ fendants to defend their interests in this suit; that 
the estate of the said J .. A .. Farrar, both personal 
and real, may b'e ·administered by the court in this cause, ~nd 
· · n proper distribution and division thereof may he made among 
tho d·istributees and heirs at. law of the said. decedent; that 
the defendant, J. C. Priddy Sheriff, and as such administrator 
of the said J. A. Farrar, deceased, may be permitted and 
required to settle before this court in this suit his accounts 
. as administrator; that an account be taken of the personal 
and real estate of "rhich the said J. A. Farrar died seized 
and possessed; that an account be taken of the debts, if any, 
of which the said J. A. Farrar o'ved upon the date of his 
death; that an account be taken of the debts, if any, owing to 
the estate of the said J. A. Farrar, by the said lVIeredith 
],ar-rar; that an account be taken of the debts, if any, owing 
to the estate of the said J. A. Farrar hy the s;;tid Jesse Farrar; 
t.hat upon the ascertaining of the indebtedness of the said 
JV[eredith Farrar and Jesse· Farrar, respectively, to the estate 
of the said J. A. Farrar, the same be deducted from f-ro~n 
the respective shares of .the said ~{eredith Farrar and Jesse 
Farrar in the estate of the said J. A. Farrar, deceased; 
t1w.t is to say, that the indebtedness of Jesse Farrar to the 
estate of J. A. Farrar be deducted from the share of the 
sai.d Jesse Farrar and only the balance remaining be paid 
over to those claiming through or under the said Jesse Far-
rar; and that the indebtedness of }feredith Farrar to the 
c.sta.t.e of J. A. Farrar, deceased, be deducted from the share 
of the said l\feredith Farrar and only the balance thereof 
he paid over to those claiming through or under the said 
1\feredith Farrar; that all accounts be taken, enquiries made, 
a.ud orders entered that ma.y be necessary or expedient to a 
just and proper administration and settlement of the estate 
of the said .J. A. Farrar, deceased; that a reasonable fee be 
allowed to George E. Allen, out of the funds coming under 
U1e control of the court in this cause for his services in prose-
cuting and conducting this suit; and that all other 
pago 8 ~ relief, both general and special, be granted to your 
complainants as the nature of their case may re-
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quire, and to equity and good conscience shall .seem meet • 
.And your complainants ·will every pray, etc. 
LELA BRUCE, ALES BRUCE, 
and ALMA JONES, Complainants, 
By Counsel. 
GEO. E. ALLEN, . 
Counsel. 
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And at another day, to-,vit: at a. circuit court held in and 
for the County of Charlotte on the 5th day of July, 1928, the 
following decree was entered herein: 
This cause came on this day to be heard upon the com-
plainants' bill; proof of legal service of the proper process on 
the respondents, Meredith Farrar, Helen Spencer Farrar, 
I.Jizzie Spencer Farrar in her own right, and as administra-
trix of the estate of J. S. Farrar, deceased, W. H. Hamilton, 
,.B. C. Spurlock, J. C. Priddy, administrator of the estate of 
J. A. Farrar, deceased, First State Bank, Incorporated, Chase 
City, Virgnia, R. R. Lane, trading as Zollinger, Lane & Com-
pany, C. D. Pennington, W. 0. Rolls and W. H. Owen, part-
ners, trading as Pennington, Owen and Rolls, Doctor C. W. 
Tucker and J. C. Booth, trading as J. C. Booth & Company, 
Hunter Miller, Recei:ver of the Farmers Savings Bank, and 
Ellen Farrar, respondents; the answer of the infant re-
spondents, Randolph Farrar and Horace Farrar, by R. Page 
1\forton, their guardian ad litem to said bill, this day, upon 
his motion, by leave of court, filed; and was argued 'by coun-
sel. 
Upon consideration whereof, it is ordered that this cause be 
referred to H. B. Chrmside1 one or the Commis-
page 9 ~ sioners in Chancery of this court, to enquire into 
and report to court as follo,vs: 
( 1) The personal estate of 'vhich the said J. A. Farrar died 
possessed. 
( 2) The real estate of which the said J. A. Farrar died 
Reized and possessed. 
(3) The debts, if any, owing by the said J. A. Farrar upon 
the date of his death. 
( 4) The liens, if any, binding the said real estate of which 
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the said J. A. Farrar died seized and possessed, and their 
1·espective dignities and priorities. 
(5) The fee simple value of the real estate of which the 
snid J. A. Farrar died seized and possessed. 
( 6) The annual value of. the said real estate. 
(7) The heirs at law of the said J. A. Farrar, and the re-
spective proportions in \vhich they are entitled to share or 
participate in the distrihution and partition of the personal 
and real estate of which the said J. A. Farrar died seized 
nnd possessed. 
(8) The liens, if any, binding on any of the shares. of the 
said heirs at Ia.w. 
(9) The advancements, if any, made by the said J. A. Farrar 
during his life time to either or any of said heirs at law. 
(10) The indebtedness, if any, dne by either or any of said 
l1eirs at law to the estate of the said J. A. Farrar, deceased. 
(11) All other matters deemed pertinent by said eom.mis-
sioner, or which he shall be requested by any party interest 
to enquire into and report upon. 
I 
Enter. 
ROBT. F. HUTCHESON. 
And a.t another day, to-wit: on the 20th day of June, 1929, 
Commissioner ·H. B. Chermside filed his report in said cause 
in obedience to said decree above set out, which 
page 10 ~ said report is in tl1e fbllowing words and figures, 
to-wit: 
1~o the Ron. Robert F. I-Iutcheson, Judge of tl1e Circuit Court 
of Charlotte County. 
The undersigned Commissioner in Ol1ancery, T)egs to re--
port, that acting in obedience to a decree of your I-Ionor's 
Court, entered in the above styled cause at tlw July Term, 
1928, and upon a reference by Geo. E. Allen, counsel for 
plaintiffs, he proceeded at his office at Charlotte C. H. Va. 
on the 23rd clay .of August to take the several accounts and 
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inquiries therein directed to be taken; the taking of ~aiel 
account was continued from day to day until the 20th day 
of June, 1929, when the same was completed. 
(1) The personal esta.te of which the said J. A. Farrar died 
possessed. 
Ans,ver: The tot.al personal property of which J. A. Farrai 
died possessed, consisting of cash in bank, crops and tangible 
personal property amom1ted in all to $1,323.52. This 'vill 
appear in settlement made by J. C. Priddy, Sheriff of Char-
lotte County as a.s such admr. of J. A. Farrar, page 10 of 
this Report, and also notes of ~Ieredith Farrar for $1,600. & 
Jesse S. Farrar for $939, both of whom are heirs and dis-
tribntees. 
(2) The real estate of 'vhich the said J. A. Farrar died 
seized .and possessed. 
Answer: J. A. Farrar died seized and possessed of a 
tract of land in Bacon District, Charlotte County, Va. con-
taining 376~i acres, more or less, adjoining the 
page 11 ~ lands of F. BB. Roberts et als. and being the resi-
due of a tract of land conveyed to him by Emily 
Woods by deed dated Aug. 4, 1897, recorded in Charlotte 
Circuit Court Clerk's Office in D. B. 46n, page 47; · 
(3) The debts if any owing by the said J. A. Farrar at the 
time of his death. 
Ans\ver: 'With the exception of certain small debts for 
medical services, nursing etc. already paid by his said admr. 
the only debts proved before your commissioner, are as fol-
lows: 
a. Note dated Dec. 4-, 1925, drawn by !£eredith 
Farrar, and payable Oct. 15, 1926, to 
$118.11 THE FIR.ST STATE BANI{, Chase City, 
Va. Principal ........................... $ 92.23 
b. Note dated Oct. 15, 1926, drawn by 1\fere-
dith and J. A. Farrar, payable to The First 
State Bank, Ol1ase City, Va. 60 days after date 
for ...................................... 189.99 
$ 37.75 with interest thereon from the 15 day of 
Dec. 1926, until paid, and 10% attorneys fees 
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on principal and interest, which said note is 
subject to a credit thereon of $165, as of 
July 2,. 1927. 
c. Note dated Oct. 15th, 1926, drawn by Mere-
dith Farrar and J. A. Farrar, payable 90 days 
after date to THE FIRST STATE BANI{, 
Chase City V a. for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89.25 
$113.25 With interest thereon from Jan. 15,1927, until 
paid, and 10% attys. fees on principal and in-
terest. 
d. Note dated Jan. 1, 1926, drawn by Meredith 
Farrar and J. A. Farrar, and payable Oct. 
15, 1926, to The FIRST- STATE BANK, 
CHASE CITY, Va. for .................. 192.80 
$256.78 with int. thereon from the 15 day of Oct. 
1926, until paid and 10% attys. fees thereon. 
- ( 4) The liens, if any binding the said real estate of which 
. · the said J. A. Farrar died seized and possessed, 
page 12 ~ and their respectiYe dignities and priorities. 
Answer: Your Commissioner has found no liet1s of record 
binding this real estate, created by J. A. Farrar during his 
life time. · 
(5) The fee simple value of the real estate of 'vhich the 
said J. A. Farrar died seized and possessed. 
A.nswer: Fee simple value $4,000.00. 
(6) _The annual rental value of said real estate. 
Answer': Annual rental value, $200.00. 
(7) The heirs at law of the said J. A. Farrar, and the 
respective proportions in which they are entitled to share or 
participate in the distribution and partition of the pe~sonal 
and real estate of which the said J. A. Farrar died seized 
nnd possessed. 
Answ·er: ,T. A. Farrar died intestate, leaving surviving 
l1im, a~ his distributees and heirs at la:w Mrs. Ellen Farrar, 
l1is widow 
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(1) Meredith Farrar, a son 
(2) Ales Bruce, a daughter 
(3) Lela Bruce, a daughter 
( 4) Alma Jones, a daughter, and 
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( 5) Jesse Farrar, a son, who has since died intestate, 
leaving surviving him, Lizzie Farrar (hiw wi.d()w) 
page 13 ~ and Horace Farrar (a son) and . : 
Randolph Farrar (a son), both of whom are infants under 
the age of 21 years. 
The widow is of course entitled to her share of the per-
sonal estate, subject to the payment of the debts of the 
deceased, and is entitled to her dower in the whole of the 
real estate. The children and grandchildren are entitled to 
their legal shares, except that, a.s will appear later, the estate 
of Jesse S. Farrar and Meredith Farrar are indebted to 
the estate. 
(8) The liens, if any, binding on any of the shares or the 
said heirs at law. 
The following liens appear of record against 
11EREDITH FARRAR. 
Reported by your Commissioner as lien against any in-
terest Meredith Farrar may have, if any, after repayment 
to the intestate's estate of the amount proved to be owing 
hy him to said estate. 
First. 
,Judgme:at in favor of Pennington, Owen and Ralls 
vs. 
Meredith Farrar. 
. ~· 
Rendered by T. ,A. Tueker, J. P. of Charlotte County April 
7, 1925, docketed in J. L. D. No.5 at pag(3 56 for $96.90. With 
int.. thereon from the 1 day of Jan. 1925 till paid 
page 14 ~ and $5.75 costs. 
.· 
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(Second.) 
Judgment in favor of State Bank of Charlotte Co. 
v. 
Meredith Farrar. 
Rendered in Charlotte Circuit Court May Term, 1925, 
docketed in J. L. D. No. 5, p. 60 for $75.00 with int. thereon 
from Nov. 2, 1924, until paid and $7.30 costs. 
(Third.) 
Judgment in favor of Hunter Miller, Receiver of Fanners 
Saving Bank 
vs. 
Meredith Farr.ar. 
Rendered in the Circuit Court of Bedford County, Va., July 
20, 1926, docketed in Charlotte Circuit Court Clerk's Office 
Aug. 28, 1926, for $159.78 with int. thereon from April 4, 
1925 until paid and 10% attys fees thereon and $5.30 costs. 
(Fourth.) 
Judgment in favor Zollinger, Lane and Co. 
vs. 
Meredith Farrar. 
f 
Rendered before A. N. Jones, J. P. of Charlotte Co"Rnty, 
Feby. 11, 1928, docketed J. L. D. No. 6, p. 18 for 
page 15 t $103.88 with int. thereon from Feb. 11, 1928, until 
paid and $1.50 costs. 
(Fifth.) 
Judgment in ·fa:v~r of First State Bank of Chase City 
vs. 
Meredith Farrar. 
Rendered in . Charlotte Circuit Court ].fay Term, 1929, 
docketed J. L. D. No.6, p. 100 for $206.50 with int. on $92.23, 
parf tl1ereof, from Oct. 15, 1925, till paid, and on $24.99, au-
other part thereof from Dec. 15, 1926, till paid and on $89.25, 
the residue thereof from Jan. 15, 1927 ·till paid and 10% 
attys. fees thereon and $5.50 costs. 
L .. Bruce, et als., v. M. Farrar, et als. 
Judgment in favor of First State Bank of Chase City 
vs. 
Meredith Farrar. 
25 
Rendered in Charlotte Circuit Court ~fay Term, 1929, 
docketed J. L. D. No. 6, p. 100, for $224.00 'vith int. thereon 
from Dec. 14, 1926, until paid and 10% attys. fees and $5.50 
costs. 
~T udgment in favor of First State Bank of Chase City 
vs. 
1\!feredith Farrar. 
page 16 ~ Judgment rendered in Charlotte Circuit Court 
J\{ay Term, 1929, docketed J. L. D. No. 6, p. 101 
for $1,790.02 with int. on $1,564.78, part thereof, from the 13 
day of Jan. 1927, and on $225.24, the residue thereof, from 
Sept. 7th, 1927, till paid, and $179, 10% attys' fees and $29.85 
costs. 
Judgment in favor of First State Bank of Chase City 
vs. 
J\feredith Farrar. 
Rendered in Charlotte Circuit Court 1\f.ay Term, 1929, J. 
L. D. No.6, p. 101, for $259.93 with int. on $192.80, pa.rt there-
of from Oct. 15, 1926, until paid, and on $67.13, the residue 
thereof from April 13, 1927, till paid and 109o attys. fees 
thereon and $5.50 costs. 
Liens of Record against 
JJiJSSE S. FARRAR. 
R.eported by your Commissioner as liens against any in-
terest JesseS. Farrar's estate may have, if any after repay-
ment to the intestate's estate of the amount proved to he 
owing· by the estate of the said Jesse S. Farrar to 
page 17 } the estate of J. A. Farrar. 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
(First.) 
~rudgment in favor of The First State Bank of Chase City 
vs . 
• Tesse S. Farrar. 
· Rendered in Pol-io Justice Court of the City of Richmond 
~fan. 18th, 1928, docketed in Charlotte Circuit Court Clerk's 
Office J. L. D. No. 6, p. 16 for $246.40 with interest thereon 
from Jan. 18, 1928 until paid and $2.75 costs . 
• Tudgment in favor of Zollinger, Lane and Co. 
vs. , 
,T esse Farrar. 
Rendered before A. N. Jones, J. P. of Charlotte County 
Feb. 11th, 1928, docketed in J. L. D. 0. No. 6, p. 18, for $61.40. 
(Third.) 
.T udgment rendered in Charlotte Circuit Court, May Term, 
1929, in favor of The First State Bank of Chase City 
. vs . 
• T. S. Farrar, for $28.45. 
(9) · The advancements, if any, made by the said J. A. 
Farrar during his life time of either or any of said heirs at 
law. 
page 18 ~ Answer: No advancements were made by the 
intestate, J. A. Farrar to any of his children, but 
n~ Uw time of ·11is death, 1\fercdith Farrar was indebted to 
lnm for the following amounts: 
In the sum of $800.00 with interest thereon from Feby. 
28, 1925, until paid, evidenced by note filed in this case 
marked "Exhibit 1\Irs. J. A. Farrar No. 4". 
In'the sum of $500.00 evidenced by a note filed in this cause, 
marked ''Exhibit Mrs. J. A. Farrar # 1' ', with int. thereon 
from July 19th, 1915, until paid. · 
In the sum of $300.00 evidenced by note (see Exhibit 1\{rs. 
L. Bruce, et als., v. M. Farrar, et als. 27 
J. A. Farrar No. 3") with int. thereon from Feby. 26, 1925 
until paid. 
And: 
At the time of the death of J. A. Farrar 
J ef?se S. Farrar was indebted to him for the following 
amounts: 
In the sum of $839.00 with int. thereon from July 19, 1927, 
until paid, evidenced by note :filed in this case, marked ''Ex-
hibit Mrs. J. A. Farrar No.2". 
In the sum of $100.00. 
In addition to the debts above reported due the estate of 
J~ A. Farrar by Meredith Farrar, the said 1v[eredith Farrar 
was a joint drawer of ·all the notes proved as debts against 
the estate of J. A. Farrar; and if said estate has to pay 
same (which it will have to do, as it is admitted that Mere-
dith Farrar is insolvent) then 1\feredith Farrar should be 
charged also with one-half (%) of the amount so paid. 
page 19 r At this point, it may not be amiss to remark 
that the sole matter at issue in this cause, is this: 
Whether or not the indebtedness to the estate of J. A. 
Farrar of 1Yieredith Farrar a.nd of the Estate of Jesse S. 
Farrar, two of the distributees and heirs at law of J. A. 
Farrar, deed. is prior to liens obtained ag-ain~t said two 
heirs and distributees and duly docketed. . 
In the opinion of Your Commissioner the heir's indebted-
ness to the estate is an equitable lien on his respective dis-
tributive share and superior to the liens of judgments doc1reted 
against him. In the opinion of your Commissioner the judg-
ments creditors of 1\'feredith Farrar and Jesse S. Farrar, 
can be, and are, in no better position that said Meredith and 
Jesse S. Farrar and can obtain from the estate of J. A. 
Fa.rrar no more that sa.id Meredith and JesseS. Farrar could 
obfain; and that therefore said 1\{eredith Farrar a.nd ,Jesse 
·s. Farrar's estate should be c.harged with their indebtedness 
to the estate of J. A. Farrar, and cannot share in any part 
thereof, until said indebtedness has been paid; their lien 
creditors in your Commissioner's opinion, cannot take any 
stronger position than they could, and can only reach by 
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their liens the REAL INTEREST of their judgment debtors 
in J. A. Farrar's estate. 1\feredith Farrar has no interest 
because he, at the time of J. A. Fa.rrar 's death, o·wed the 
estate much in excess of his share therein, and the interest 
of the estate of Jesse Farrar, is small, if it exists. Your 
Commissioner has not found, nor has his attention been called, 
to any Virginia case, exactly in point, hut the decisions cited 
by Mr. Allen, of counsel for certain of the heirs and distribu-
tees, seems to him to be founded on equity and to be sound. 
(10) This inquiry has been fully·answered under t'9''. 
Notices, exhibits and depositions returned with report. 
Respectfully submitted this 20 day of June, 1929. 
II. B. CHERMSIDE, 
Commr. in Chancery. 
J. C. PRIDDY, Administrator· 
In Account with 
Estate of J. H. Farrar 
2/ 7/28 By cash collected from First National Bank, 
Chase City, Va. $ 855.87 
2/18/28 By cash from sale of 1666 pounds tobacC'o 227.41 
2/28/28 By cash from sale personal property 164.15 
2/ 7/28 To amt. paid J(. L. Woody, Attorney, credit on 
fcc $ 30.00 
2/ 7/28 To amt. paid K. L. ·woody, Comr. of Accounts 
for examining and approving inventory 2.00 
2/ 7/28 To amt. paid H. B. Chermside, Clerk, state ta."l{ 
and cost qualification 7.25 
2/ 7/28 ·To amt. paid H. B. Chcrmside, Clerk, for record-
ing inventory 1. 75 
2/11/28 To amt. paid Dickerson & Collins, undertakers, 
burial expenses 129.50 
2/25/28 To amt. paid \V. L. Jones, repayment of nurses 
and drug bill 47.00 
2/25/28 To amt. paid G. 0. Bruce, for handling and mar-
keting tobacco 36.57 
2{25/28 To amt. paid H. G. Clark, auctioneer, crying sale 10 .. 00 
2/25/28 To amt. paid H. B. Chermside, Clerk, r<>cording 
account of sales 1.75 
2/25/28 To amt. paid K. L. 'Voody, Comr. of Accounts 
for approving RC'count of sales 1.50 
2/29/28 To amt. paid C. H. Saunders, M.D., for services 
in last illness 31.50 
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2/'l.!J/28 To amt. paid \V. P. McGuirP, M.D., for services 
rendered in last illness S30.10 
4/22/28 To amt. paid Acree Devin, for hauling tobacco 
to market 6.66 
4/23/28 To five per cent commissions deducted by trustee 
on $1,208.38 62.37 
8/23/28 To amt. paid Milton Ayers, R. B. Chancier and 
Jesse Ayers, appraisers 3.00 
2/25/28 To amt. paid Mrs. J. A. Farrar, on her dis-
tributivc share, same being paid by giving her 
credit for property bought by her at sale 34.25 
Amt. in hand 812.23 
$1,247.43 $1,247.43 
Bn.l 812.23 
11/24/28 To paid W. G. 'Villiams 1928 taxes $89.60 
12/21/28 To II Mrs . .Ellen Farrar, 100.00 
1929 It " " " " 50.00 
May 26 
1928 
Dec. 21 By 1/4 sale of tobacco G. 0. Bruce 13.43 
" " " Cl " " Pollard Elam 21.25' 
1929 
Feby 13 " " " " " G. 0. Bruce 41.41 
To commissions on 76.09 3.80 
Bal 644.92 
888.32 888.32 
And at another day, to-wit: on the day of , 
1929, C. D. Pennington, W. ll. Q,ven and W. 0. Ralls, part-
ners, trading as Pennington, Owen & Ralls, and the First 
State B.ank, Incorporated of Chase City, Virginia, filed cer-
taiil exceptions to said report on behalf of themselves and 
all other lien creditors of 1\feredith. Farrar and J·. S. ],arrar, 
which exceptions are in the following words and figures, to-
wit: 
C. D. Pennington, '\V. H. Owen and '\V. 0. Ralls, partners 
trading as Pen11ington, Owen & Ralls, and rrhe First State 
Bank, Inc., of Chase City, Virginia, on behalf of themselves 
nnd all other lien creditors of ~Ieredith Farrar and J. S. 
~,arrar, except to the report of Commissioner H. B. 
page 22 ~ Chermside, filed in the above styled suit on the 20th 
day of June, 1929, in this respect, to-wit: 
That said Commissioner Chermside in said report rules 
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that the simple contract· debts due and owing by the said 
~ieredith and J. S. Farrar to J. A. Farrar, the decedent, at 
the time of his death are equitable liens upon the respective . · 
interests ·of the said ~Ieredith and J. S. Farrar in the real 
estate of which the said J. S. Farrar died seized, superior in 
dignity to the lien debts of record of the exceptors and others 
set forth in said commissioner's report. · 
PENNINGTON, OWEN & RALLS, 
THE FIRST STATE BANK, 
By J. KENT EARLY & CHAS. J. F AULI{NER, 
Their counsel. 
. A.i1d no,v, at this day, to-,vit: on the 21st day of October, 
1929~ the following decree was entered herein: 
This cause came on this day to be heard upon the papers 
formerly read; upon the report of II. B. Chermside, Com-
missioner in Chancery!, made in obedience to the decree en-
tered in this cause at the January term, 1928, and filed on 
the 20th day of January, 1929. 
Upon· the exceptions to the report of Commissioner Cherm-
side, filed by C. D. Pennington, W. H. Owen and W. 0. Ralls, 
and the First State Bank of Chase City, Incorporated, Chase 
City, Virginia; said exceptions being filed on behalf of them 
and all other lien creditors of 1\tieredith Farrar and J. S. 
Farrar; and was argued by counsel. 
On consideration ·whereof, the court doth sustain the ex-
. ceptions filed to the report of Commissioner 
page 23 ~ Chermside, and doth so decide; and doth adjudge, 
order and decree that the lien debts of record 
against the interest of the said Meredith Farrar and J. S. Far-
rar in the real estate of the deceased father, J. A. Farrar, 
are superior in dignity to the simple contract debts due by 
the said Meredith Farrar and J. S. Farrar to the estate of 
the Rnid J. A. Farrar,, deceased, and are .entitled to have 
priority in payment out of the interests of the said Meredith 
Farrar and ,J. S. Farrar in the real estate they inherited 
from their deceased father, the said J. A. Farrar, when the 
same is sold. 
And it appearing to the court that the said J. A. Farrar, 
at the time of his death, was seized and possessed of 376 3/4 
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acres of land, situated in Bacon Magisterial· District, Char- . 
lotte County, Virginia, adjoining the lands of F. B. Roberts· 
and others, and being the residue of a tract of land conveyed 
to him by one Emily Woods hy deed dated August 4th, 1897, 
and of record in the clerk's office of this county, in Deed 
Book 46, at page 47, and it further appearing to the court 
that the heirs at la'v of the said J. A. Farrar, at the time of 
his death were his "ridow, 1\tlrs. Ellen Farrar, and his five 
children, to-wit: 1\tferedith Farrar, Ales Bruce, Lela Bruce, 
Alma Jones and JesseS. Farrar, and it still further appear-
ing to the court that the widow is entitled to have her dower 
assigned in said land, and that the children (heirs at law of· ~ 
J. A. Farrar, deceased) are entitled to have partition made 
of the balance of the real estate of the said J. A. Farrar, 
and that the lien creditors of the said J. S. Farrar and Mere-
dith Farrar are entitled to have subjected to the payment of 
their liens, the shares alotted to the said J. S. Farrar and 
lYieredith Farrar, the court does adjudge, order and decree ·. 
that W. L. Jones, C. C. Spencer, J. B .. Burton, Henry Powell 
and S. S. Carden, 'vho ·are hereby appointed commissioners 
for the purpose, after having first been duly sworn, do pro-
ceed to lay off and divide the real estate of which 
page 24 ~ the late J. A. Farrar died seized and possessed, · 
·and that they do assign one-third of the said real 
estate, including the mansion house, having regard to the 
quantity, quality and value, to ::.Mrs. Ellen Farrar, the widow 
of J. A. Farrar, for and as her dower, and that they do 
divide tlie balance of the said real estate into five equal parts, 
having regard to the quantity, quality and value, and t1at 
they do assign one of said parts to Ales Bruce, one to Lela 
Bruce, one to Alma. Jones, and one to Jesse S. Farrar. The 
said commissioners 'are authorized to retain and employ a 
competent surveyor in making said partiton if they deem 
it necessary. 
But if the said eom.missioners should find that partition 
cannot be con:Veniently made of the said real estate, among 
the aforesaid par-ties, then they are required to report the 
facts upon which their opinion is based, to the court, and also 
whether the interests of those who are entitled to the said 
real estate, or the proceeds, 'viii be promoted by a sale of 
the entire real estate, or allotment of part, and sale of the 
residue, and what in their opinion is the fee simple value of 
the 'vhole ·of the said real estate of which the said J. A. 
Farrar died seized and possessed, and in either case, they are 
required to report their proceedings under this decree to 
court. 
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And the court doth not at this time appoint commissioners 
to maxe sale of the shares to be allotted to the said Mere-
dith Farrar and the said Jesse Farrar until the partition 
herein dir.ected tOt be made has been completed, and said par-
i i ti on confirmed. 
(~1:E~IORANDU~L) 
"\Vith said decree there was filed the following opinion of 
the court: 
page 25 r J. A. Farrar died intestate on the 5th of Jan-
ua.ry, 1928, seized and possessed of a tract of 
laud containing- 376-3/4 acres, and cash and tangible per-
sonalty amounting- to $1,243.43, and leaving as his distribu-
tees and heirs at l.fl"r a wido,\r, three daughters, and two 
sons, Meredith Farrar and J. S. Farrar. Each of the sons 
was indebted to his father at the time of the latter's death, 
by simple contract dehts not reduced to judgment, in an 
amount exceeding in the case of one, and practically equalling, 
in the case of the other, the value of said son's 1/5· undivided 
interest in the real estate of which the father died seised. 
None of the daughters owed their father anything. An ad-
ministrator was appointed for J. A. Farrar, and took charge 
of the personal estate. ~ieredith and J. S. Farrar 'vere 
also indebted to the First State Bank of Chase City, to 
Penning-ton, Owen & Ralls, and to other creditors, defendants 
in this suit, in large amounts 'vhen their father died, upon 
which debts, judgments have been obtained and duly dock-
eted. Within a few days after the father's death, on Jan-
nary 9, 1928, both of them made deeds by which they at-
tempted to convey all their interest in their father's estate; 
and on January 27th, suits were instituted by their creditors 
to set aside these deeds as fraudulent, 'vith the result that 
said deeds were eventually set aside by this court. While 
these suits were pending, in April, 1928, the present suit 
'vas instituted by the three daughters of J. A. Farrar, dec'd., 
making defendants his administrator and widow, their two 
brothers, and the creditors of said brothers who were seek-
ing to subject the interest of the latter in said real estate 
to the payment of their debts. 
Briefly, complainants claim that by reason of the indebted-
ness of ~feredith Farrar and J. S. Farrar to their father, ex-
ceeding the value of the 1/5 interest which thev 
))age 26 ~ 'vould have inherited,_ they have no interest in said 
real estate which they could either convey by deed, 
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·or which creditors can subject. The bill prays that the entire 
estate of J. A. Farrar, ·both real and personal, may be ad-
ministered by the court, and distributed and divided among 
his heirs at law; that the indebtech1ess of :Meredith and J. S. 
Farrar to their father be ascertained and deducted from 
their shares in his estate before anything is paid to those 
claiming under them. It contains a prayer that an account 
of the debts owing by J. A. Farrar at the time of his death 
he taken, but it does not allege that the personal estate is 
insufficient for the payment of all decedent's debts, and as a 
matter of fact the record sho,vs that there is sufficient per-
sonal estate, without taking into account the debts due by 
M:eredith and J. S. Farrar, to pay all decedent's debts, so 
that if any sale of the real estate is to be had in this. suit, 
it must he for purposes of partition, and n.ot from any 
necessity to administer it under the statute making it assets 
for the payment of debts. The case 'vas referred to a com-
missioner, who was .required among other things to report, 
"The heirs at law of J. A. Farrar, and the respective propor-
tions in 'vhich they are entitled to share or participate in 
the distribution and partition of the personal and real estate 
of which said J. A. Farrar died seised and possessed". Tile 
commissioner, after taking accounts showing the value of de..: 
cedent's real estate, and the amount of the indebtedness of 
Meredith and J. S. Farrar to their father, found and re-
ported that l\{eredith Farrar had no interest, because he at 
the time of J . . l\.. Farrar's death owed the estate much in 
excess of his share therein, ·and the interest of J. S. Farrar 
is small, if it exists at all". He further reported that after 
carefully considering the argltments of counsel and the au-
thorities cited he was of the opinion that an heir's indehted-
ness to the estate creates an equitable lien on his intere~t 
iu decedent's real estate,. superior to the lien of 
page 27 } judgments docketed against him. The judgment 
creditors excepted, and this brings squarely be-
fore the court as the only issue in this cause the following 
question: · 
Is the interest of an heir in the real estate of his intestate 
nncestor cl1argeahle 'vith simple contract debts due by such 
lteir to his ancestor, in preference to valid recorded liens of 
other creditors of such heir, duly obtained¥ 
The question presented .is a ue'v one in this jurisdiction, 
nncl there do not appear to be any Virginia. decisions w·hich 
throw light on it. Before approaching it, it. may be wei~ 
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to mention .some undisputed principles of la.w ·which h:aJve 
some bearing on its solution. The transaction between father 
t\nd sons in this case created the relation of debtor and 
ci·editor, and it is admitted that they cannot be considered 
as advancements, and are not governed by Sec. 5278 of the 
Code on that subject. Also there can be no question of the 
fact that in Virginia. an administrator of an intestate takes 
title to and administers personal estate only, and has noth-
hig- to do with real estate, which descends directly to the heir 
i1pon the death of the ancestor, without the intervention or 
·eontrol of any court of probate, subject to the debts of the 
ancestor (when there is not sufficient personalty to pay them), 
"'hich debts are enforceable only in equity in a suit brought 
for the purpose. It .is also well settled that a judgment 
~reditor, where statutory enactments do not interfere, can 
a~qqire no better rig·ht to the estate of a debtor than the 
debtor himself has, and that a court of equity 'vill limit 
tlie ·uen of a judgment to the. actual interest which the debtor 
has in the estate. 
'\¥hile there are no Virginia decisions, the question has 
l)een before the courts of other States frequently and there 
. are two lines of authority in direct conflict 'vith 
page 28 ~ each other. One line of cases holds that realty 
· descends directly to the heir upon the death of 
the a'ncestor, subject only to statutory qualifications which 
make real property liable for a decedent's debts, and that 
as the administrator has nothing to do with real property, 
there is no opportunity to set off the debt of the heir against 
his interest in the realty, or to retain it out of any fund 
under the administrator's CQntrol, and that there is no 
cquitahle lien on realty descended to the heir for simple con-
tract debts due the ancestor. The other line proceeds upon 
1:lw theory that equality of inherita.nce among persons stand-
big in the same degree of kinship to the ancestor is the policy 
of the law, and that since realty and personalty pass to the 
same persons, they are to be considered as one common fund, 
nnd the heir cannot take one class of property without ac-
eounting for what he has already received out of the other 
class. Some cases taking the latter vie'v call it the right of 
retainer, or set-off, and others put it on the gTound that an 
heir takes real estate charged ·with an equitable lien in favor 
of other heirs for the amount of his unpaid debt to the per- · 
sonal estate. 
lllarv·in v. Bowlby, 142 1viich. 245, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 189, 
is· one of the leading cases adopting the first view. Jacob 
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Bowlby died leaving real and personal estate. Elmer Bowlby, 
his son, owed his father $3,362.62, for whic.h the administra-
tor obtained a judgment against him, but before its lien at-
tached, the said Elmer had executed mortgages on a por-
tion of his interest in ·his father's real estate. The adminis~· 
b·ator :filed a bill alleging that the personal estate of his de-
cedent had been exhausted in the payment of debts; that ·the 
real estate 'vas in his possession as administrator,. ·and it 
would be necessary to sell the same ; that the mortgages exe-
cuted by Elmer Bowlby constituted a cloud on the title to 
. tl1is real estate ; and that inasmuch as he was in-
page 29 ~ solvent, it would rbe necessary to apply his distri-
butive share in the real estate to the judgment 
which complainant had obtained against him, and complainant 
prayed that this might be done and the mortgages set aside 
as clouds. Defendant demurred on the ground, among others, 
that no case was made by the bill entitling complainant to 
relief in equity. After reviewing a number of authorities 
on both sides, the court .said: 
"It is a recognized doctrine that the distributive share 
derived from personal property of an heir indebted to an 
estate may be retained by, the administrator in payment of 
such debt. The doc.trine is founded upon principle as well 
as upo:h authority. It is, in fi:wt, the collection of a debt 
due the estate. Personal estate is assets in the hands of 
the administrator. He is required by la'v to convert personal 
property into money, to collect all debts. due the estate from 
all debtors, including heirs. The heir has no title or claim 
to personal estate except a distributive share in the surplus 
after payment of debts and expenses of administration., 
''No such doetrine has prevailed as to real estate. The title 
to real estate vests in the heir at the da.te of the death of 
the ancestor. Real estate is not assets in the hands of a 
personal representative, and, unless other,vise charged by 
the terms of a ·will, is subject on1y to the contingency of a 
sale of so much thereof as may be necessary to pay the 
debts of the estate in· c.ase there is not sufficient personal 
estate for that purpose. This statutory contingency is a 
modifi.ca tion of. the common law, and no sale of real estate 
to pay debts could be made before this modification. It has 
been held repeatedly, not only that no sale of real estate 
can be made except for this purpose, but also .that only so 
much of the real estate can be sold as may be necessary 
for that purpose, and that 'vhere, because of the indivisi-
bility of real estate the whole must be sold, the surplus, b): 
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.the doctrine of equitable ·conversion, is considered as real 
estate, and as such goes to the heirs. There is one recog-
nized exception to the general rule a.bove stated. Indebted-
ness· of the heir to the estate which may be held to be 
an advancement may be considered in .the division of real 
esta~te among heirs. The recent cases cited as supporting 
complainant's contention are not based upon authority. The 
Texas case is the only one 'vhich goes to the full extent 
cla.iin.ed by complainant, and that case is based upon the 
argliment in Case of .Akenna;n, supra, 'vherein the court 
expressly stated: 'I am not deciding a. case where there is a 
mere gift of real estate e * * But here· I am dealing 'vith a 
case such as I have mentioned-,vith a general fund, made up 
of proceeds of sale of real estate, and proceeds of converstion 
of personal estate.' The other cases relied upon are 'vhere 
surplus from the real estate has been in the hands of the 
personal representative for distribution, and the doctrine of 
equitable conversion has not been recog-nized, or 'vhere some 
statutory provision has influenced the decision. The great 
weight of .the authorities holds the contrary doc-
page 30 ~ trine.'' 
To the same effect is the opinion in La Foy v. La Foy,. 
43 N. J. Eq. 206·, 3 Am. St. Rep. 302, 10 Atl. 266, a case in 
which it 'vas attempted to charg-e a debt of a devisee upon 
lands devised to him by the testator, there being no lan-
guage in tile will making such a debt a charge. The court 
said: 
''The devisee of lands occupies no such relation to the 
execui{;or as that which exists between legatee and executor. 
No act is necessary on the part of the executor to put the 
devisee in full enjoyment of the estate dewised. The oppor-
tunity, therefore, could not arise for the executor to retain 
the debt of the devisee to the testator out of any demand 
which the devisee might seek to enforce against tl1e execu-
tor. If such a charge attaches ag-ainst the land devised, it 
'vould be necessary for the executor ·to establish it by pro-
ceedings in which he is the actor. After diligent search, I 
have been unable to find a case in wl1ich an attempt has been 
made to cl1arge a devisee of lands with a debt due from the 
devisee to the testator, in the absence of language in the 
'vill ma~1ifesting the purpose of the testator to do so." 
The same cloc.trine obtains in ~:fassacl1usetts, as will appear 
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from the following language of the court in Dearborn v. 
Preston,, 7 Allen 192: 
"The rule of la'v upon the subject is so well known and 
established that there can be no doubt of the legal right 
of a. devisee of real estate to take and hold it absolutely, free 
. from any lien or charge of encumbrance as security for any-
thing which he ow·ed to the testator, and may still owe to 
his legal representatives. It was very early determined that 
in the division among the heirs of the real estate of a per-
son who died intestate, no deduction w:ould be made from 
the share of any one of them for or on account of any debt 
due from him to the intestate; and tha there wa_s no lien 
or charge in any form subsisting upon such share as security 
for such debt, or which could in any way be enforced to-
wards its payment.'' 
The Arkansas court deals with the subject thus in Wheeler 
v. J( nox, 206 S. W. 47: 
"The conflict existing in the decisions of other states can-
not be entirely reconciled. The courts themselves 
page 31 ~ are divided as to where the weight of authority lies, 
as will be discovered by reference to the following 
authorities (citing the principal cases). In this state, it is 
firmly established that the real estate of the intestate descends 
directly to the heirs upon the death of the ancestor, subject 
·to the statutory exceptions. There is no statute incumbering 
an heirs interest in real estate 'vith his indebtedness to the 
aneestor. vVith these two guide posts, it seems but a. step 
in the process of logic to determine that the heir's interest 
in real estate descends to him free from his general debts 
to his intestate, and that it is unnecessary to enter upon the 
uncertain course of determining where .the general authority 
lies. It is insisted strmtously by appellee that the great 
weight of authority sustains the equitable doctrine of offset 
or retainer in the settlement of estates between heirs. In 
support of this contention, a number of authorities are cited. 
l\{ost of the cases cited, however, pertain to a fund held 
by administrators or executors and do not pertain to real 
estate. In some of the cases cited it is pointed out that 
the rule is not the same with reference to the two classes of 
property. It seems that in the states where the doctrine of 
equitable offset or retainer is applied to :both classes of prop-
erty, it is because the statute of the state makes no distinction 
.in the descent of personalty and realty. ~n Arkansas, the 
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distinctions between the two classes of property have been 
preserved. An admiuistra.tor takes charge of the personalty 
for the purpose of administering· on the estate. Not so with 
t.he realty. Unless it becomes necessary to appropriate real 
property to pay the indebtedness of estate, the administra-
_tor cannot even take possession of it. It does nqt concern 
ltim, because lauds are not administered through him. Lands 
desc~nd in Arkansas directly to the heir, subject 'to the ex-
eeptions provided in the statute of descents and distribu-
tions." 
For the ·contrary vie,v, Stenson v. H cilvorson, 28 N. Dak. 
151, 147 N. W. 800, Ann. Cas. 1916D, p. 1289, is cited as 
the leading case. The facts in tha.t case were exactly the 
·same as in the case at bar, though it got into court under a 
somewhat different system of procedure. The probate court, 
in the course of administration, charg·ed off tl1e indebtedness 
of a son to his father against the son's interest in the real 
estate, and excluded the son from participation in its distri-
bution. Judgment c.reditors of the son, however, levied on 
his interest in the real estate (as it seems they may do in 
North Dakota), and attempted to sell it, 'vhere-
page 32 ~ upon the assignees of those heirs to 'vhom the real 
estate had been given by the proha.te court brought 
this statutory action to enjoin said sale, quiet their title, and 
determine adverse claims to real property. After noticing 
that the indebtedness of the son to the father (as in the case-
at bar) could not be considered an advancement, the court 
said: 
''The distinction thus dra-wn by the ],£ichigan court (in 
1Jfa.1·vin v. Bow·lby) between real and personal estates is not 
applicable in North Dakota, for by Sec. 5186, Rev. Codes, 
the prope-rty both real and personal of one who dies intestate 
passes to the heirs of sueh estate, subject to the control of the 
control of the County Court, and to the possession of the ad-
ministrator for the purposes of administration. In other 
words, no distinction whatever is made between the hvo 
classes of estates in this regard. With due deference to the 
opinion of the ~Hchi_gau court, we think the great weight of 
authority, as well as the hotter reasoning, is opposed to its 
l1olding in lJ:larvin v. Bowlby. As stated by Judge "\Voerner 
in 2 Amer. Law of Administration, Sec. Ed., sec. 564, ''the 
tendency seems to be in favor of the right of set-off'', as to 
real as well as to personal property, and in 1 Ross on Pro-
hate Law & Practice, p. 845, it is unqualifiedly stated that 
"the inclebtedne~s of a distributee to the estate may be de-
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ducted from his share'' (citing cases from 'Vashington, Mis-
souri, Tennessee, California, Ohio, 1\farylaud and Pennsyl-
vania) "" * * As said by the Ohio court in Keever v. H'IJIYI,ter, 
62 Ohio St. 615, 'A proposition necessarily intvolved in .the 
decision of the circuit court is that in a case of this character 
a son who owes a debt which is payable at all vents occupies 
a better position than one who has received an advancemen~ 
'vhich is not payable otherwise than as it may serve to 
diminish his inheritance. The conclusion does not contribute 
to the equality of inheritance which is made so prominent 
in the legislation and the decisions of this state. The statute 
upon the subject of advancements distinguishes gifts by way 
of advancement from other gifts. It does not make a gift· by 
way of advancement more onerous to the child who receivers 
it than is a debt to the child who o'ves it. It is not important 
whether, to secure equality in cases of this character, we 
adopt the doctrine of equita.ble set-off, as has been done by 
some courts, or, for that purpose regard the debt as an 
advancement, as has been done by others. The ground of the 
decision is that it is inequitable and at variance with the 
policy defined in our statutes to permit one to share in an 
estate which is diminished by his default and to the prejudice 
of those whose rig-hts are equal to his.'' 
The Texas case of Oxsheer v. Nave, 37 I.J. R. A. 98, dis-
cusses the question a.t some length, but the gist of the reasons 
for its conclusion is found in the following ex-
page 33 } cerpts : 
''The right to have the debt of the legatee or distributee 
charged to him in the adjustment of the legacy or the dis-
tributive share is called a right of 'set-off', or of 'retainer'. 
But the inaccuracy of the former expression has been pointed 
out in Cherry v. Boultbee, and has frequently been recog-
nized in other cases. So the improper use of the word 
'retainer' in the same connection has been commented upon. 
The right, in our opinion, rests not so much upon any rule 
of set-off or of retainer, as upon the broad principles of 
equity. «< * * 
"Under our statutes, the real and personal estate of ·an 
intestate descend alike to the heirs charged 'vith the pay:.. 
ment of debts, and subject to administration 'for that pur-
pose. Both the real and personal property, 'vhen adminis-
tered, are subject to distribution among the heirs, in one 
proceeding. The debt of ·one of the heirs to the esta.te is a 
part of the general mass of property subject to distribution, 
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and if· such heir fail to pay it, if more than his share, so 
much of it as amounts to the value of his share should be 
set apart to him; if less than his .share, it should be taken 
by him in satisfaction -of that share, so far as it 'vill go * * * 
The principle is this, a person 'vho o'ves an estate money, 
that is to say, who is bound to increase the general mass by 
a contribution of his own, cannot claim an aliquot share 
given to him out of that mass 'vithout first making the con-
tribution which completes it. Nothing is in truth retained 
by the representative of the estate; nothing is in strict lan-
guage set off; but. the contributor is paid by holding in his 
own hand a part of the mass, which, if the mass were com-
pleted, he would receive back.'' 
In Wilson v. Cha.nnell, 102 l{an. 793, 1 .ll. L. R .. 987, the 
court approves the reasoning of Stenson v. Halvorson, supra, 
and adds: 
''A number of cases make a distinction between personal 
and real property, so far as the application of the principle 
now being discussed is concen1ed. There is no substantial 
justification for a less eqnittable rule in favor of the estate, 
so far as real property is concerned, than there is for the 
rule, acl{no,vledged by almost all the authorities, concerning 
personal property. If, in the distribution of personal prop-
erty, a distributee \Vho is a debtor of the estate gets an ad-
vantage over the other distributees because his debt is not 
deducted from his distributive share, then tlw inheritor of 
real property .likewise gets an advantage over the other in-
heritors, if his debt to the estate eari.not be in some way de-
ducted from the share of real property which he receives. 
T1w equities which' compel the rule concerning 
page 34 ~ personal property are just as strong in favor of 
the same rule concerning real property. * * * 
The language used in the North Dakota statute is different 
from that used in ours ; hut the result is the same. 'V'ith 
us, personal property descends to the heh· the same as real 
property, 'vith this exception: that the administrator. must 
take possession of the personal properfy and use that prop-
erty :first for the payment of the debts of the decedent. The 
administrator may sell the real property for the payment 
of those debts, if there is not sufficient personal property.', 
There are numerous other cases on both sides of the ques-
tion but they advance no new reasons for their respective 
positions, and the quotations given above are sufficient to 
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show the process of reasoning by which courts have reached 
these opposite conclusions, and also that they are not agreed 
among themselves as to where lies either the 'veight of au-
thority, or the better reason. I am of the opinion that the 
cases following the doctrine of 11tlarvin v. Bowlby are more 
in harmony with the recognized principles of Virginia law 
on the subject of liens, and of descent and distribution, than 
the· contrary school. It will be noticed in the quotations from 
cases holding the opposite vie'v (and the annotations on the 
subject in A. L. R. state that it is generally true of cases 
taking that vie,v), that the statutes of descent and distribu-
tion in .these states make no distinction between real and per-
sonal prQperty, but both are considered as one common ma.ss-
. or fund and pass alike into the possession ·and control of an 
administrator, or probate court, for the purpose of adminis-
tration and of distribution of the surplus among heirs. In 
Virginia, the whole personal estate goes into the hands of 
an administrator and nothing passes to the distributees unless 
and until all debts of the decedent have been paid and the 
costs of administration; then, if tl1ere is a surplus, it is divi"ded 
nmong the same persons, and in the sa:r;ne proportions, as 
real estate. The real estate descends directly to the heirs 
in parcenary at the moment of the death of the ancestor, but, 
subject to the contingency that if personal a·ssets 
page 35 ~ are not sufficient for the payment of debts, creditors 
may bring a suit in equity for a sale of so much 
of the real estate as may be necessary for that purpose. Under 
this state of the law, there is no opportunity, as was said 
in La Foy v. La. Foy, suprCli, for the application of the doc-
trines of "retainer", or "set-off". In order that these prin-
ciples may be applicable, there must be a mutual and recipro-
cal indebtedness of the parties, the one to the other, which 
does not exist in this case. Meredith Farrar is indebted 
. to the administrator of his father, and ultimately to his sis-
ters, but they are not indebted to him and the real estate 
which he inherits has not come from them. Nor can I agree 
with the Texas court that ''broad principles of equity'' de-
mand that real estate descended to an heir must be declared 
impressed with a lien in favor of co-heirs for a simple con-
tract debt due the ancestor, which such co-heirs have come 
to own in the conrse of adn~·i,J1Jitra.tio·n. The consideration 
for such a debt has not come from them, and they have 
paid nothing of value for it; upon what theory ought their 
rights against a co-heir's real estate be held superior to 
the rights of creditors who have parted with value for their 
debts and have exercised the diligence which the law com-
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mends in reducing their claims to judgment and obtaining 
statutory liens~ However desirable equality of inheritance 
may be, it ought not to be brought about at the price of in-
justice to creditors. The inequality in this case, if it exists, 
is not the fault of the law, but comes from the fact that J. A. 
Farrar did ~1ot care to take judgments against his sons and 
make their debts to him a lien on anything they may own, 
'vbile other creditors did. His daughters o·wn 'vhat he left 
them, and the la'v gives them-their proportionate shares 
in his real estate, and the .surplus of his personal estate, 
the latter being a simple contract debt against their brothers. 
_The exc.eptions to the commissioner's report will be sus-
tained. 
ROBERT F. HUTCHESON. 
Sept. 13, 1929. 
I, H. B. Chermside, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Charlotte 
County, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true tran-
Hcript of the record, as agreed upon by couns.el for the parties, 
in the chancery suit depending in said court, styled Lela 
Bruce, Ales Bruce and Alma Jones complainants vs. Meredith 
Ji,arrar, Helen Spencer Farrar, Lizzie Spencer Farrar, in 
her own right, and as administratrix of the P.state of .T. S. 
Farrar, deceased, Randolph Farrar, an infant within the age 
of twenty-one years, Horace Farrar, an infant within the 
age· of hventy-one years, W. H. IIa.milton., B. C. Spurlock, 
,T. C. Priddy, administrator of the estate of J. A. Farrar, de-
<·cased, The First State Bank, Inc., Chase City, Virginia, 
R .. R. Lane, trading as Zollinger, Lane & Co., C. D. Penning-
toll, W. 0. Rolls & W. H. Owen, partners, trading as Pen-
nington, Owen & Rolls, Dr. C. W. Tucker and J. C. Booth, 
trading -as J. C. Booth & Co., and IIunter ~filler, Receiver 
of Farmers Savings Bank, and Ellen Farrar, 'vidow of J. A. 
Farrar, deceased, defendants, and I further certify that coun-
~cl for the defendants had due notice of the intention , of 
eounsel for the complainants to apply for this transcript. 
Given under my hand this 17 day of ~larch, 1930. 
H. B. CHERl\iSIDE, Clerk. 
ylerk's fee for copy of record, $18.00. 
A Copy-Teste.: 
H. STEW ART JONES, C. C. 
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